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NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary print of the United States Reports.  Readers are requested to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
ington, D.C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
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No. 91-905
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JANET RENO, ATTORNEY GENERAL, et al., PETI-
TIONERS v. JENNY LISETTE FLORES et al.
on writ of certiorari to the united states court
of appeals for the ninth circuit
[March 23, 1993]

  Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court.
  Over the past decade, the Immigration and Naturaliza-
tion Service (INS) has arrested increasing numbers of
alien juveniles who are not accompanied by their parents
or other related adults.  Respondents, a class of alien
juveniles so arrested and held in INS custody pending
their deportation hearings, contend that the Constitution
and immigration laws require them to be released into the
custody of -responsible adults.-

                            I
  Congress has given the Attorney General broad discre-
tion to determine whether and on what terms an alien
arrested on suspicion of being deportable should be
released pending the deportation hearing.  The Board of
Immigration Appeals has stated that -[a]n alien generally
. . . should not be detained or required to post bond
except on a finding that he is a threat to the national
security . . . or that he is a poor bail risk.-  Matter of
Patel, 15 I. & N. Dec. 666 (1976); cf. INS v. National
Center for Immigrants' Rights (NCIR), 502 U. S. ___
(1991) (upholding INS regulation imposing conditions upon
release).  In the case of arrested alien juveniles, however,
the INS cannot simply send them off into the night on
bond or recognizance.  The parties to the present suit
agree that the Service must assure itself that someone
will care for those minors pending resolution of their
deportation proceedings.  That is easily done when the
juvenile's parents have also been detained and the family
can be released together; it becomes complicated when the
juveniles are arrested alone, i.e. unaccompanied by a
parent, guardian, or other related adult.  This problem is
a serious one, since the INS arrests thousands of alien
juveniles each year (more than 8,500 in 1990 alone)-as
many as 70% of them unaccompanied.  Brief for Petition-
ers 8.  Most of these minors are boys in their mid-teens,
but perhaps 15% are girls and the same percentage 14
years of age or younger.  See id., at 9, n. 12; App. to Pet.
for Cert. 177a.
  For a number of years the problem was apparently dealt
with on a regional and ad hoc basis, with some INS
offices releasing unaccompanied alien juveniles not only
to their parents but also to a range of other adults and
organizations.  In 1984, responding to the increased flow
of unaccompanied juvenile aliens into California, the INS
Western Regional Office adopted a policy of limiting the
release of detained minors to -`a parent or lawful guard-
ian,'- except in -`unusual and extraordinary cases,'- when
the juvenile could be released to -`a responsible individual
who agrees to provide care and be responsible for the
welfare and well being of the child.'-  See Flores v. Meese,
934 F. 2d 991, 994 (CA9 1990) (quoting policy), vacated,
942 F. 2d 1352 (CA9 1991) (en banc).
  In July of the following year, the four respondents filed
an action in the District Court for the Central District of
California on behalf of a class, later certified by the court,
consisting of all aliens under the age of 18 who are
detained by the INS Western Region because -a parent or
legal guardian fails to personally appear to take custody
of them.-  App. 29.  The complaint raised seven claims,
the first two challenging the Western Region release policy
(on constitutional, statutory, and international law
grounds), and the final five challenging the conditions of
the juveniles' detention.
  The District Court granted the INS partial summary
judgment on the statutory and international-law challeng-
es to the release policy, and in late 1987 approved a
consent decree that settled all claims regarding the
detention conditions.  The court then turned to the
constitutional challenges to the release policy, and granted
the respondents partial summary judgment on their equal-
protection claim that the INS had no rational basis for
treating alien minors in deportation proceedings differently
from alien minors in exclusion proceedings (whom INS
regulations permitted to be paroled, in some circumstanc-
es, to persons other than parents and legal guardians,
including other relatives and -friends,- see 8 CFR
212.5(a)(2)(ii) (1987)).  This prompted the INS to initiate
notice-and-comment rulemaking -to codify Service policy
regarding detention and release of juvenile aliens and to
provide a single policy for juveniles in both deportation
and exclusion proceedings.-  52 Fed. Reg. 38245 (1987).
The District Court agreed to defer consideration of respon-
dents' due process claims until the regulation was promul-
gated.
  The uniform deportation-exclusion rule finally adopted,
published on May 17, 1988, see Detention and Release of
Juveniles, 53 Fed. Reg. 17449 (codified as to deportation
at 8 CFR 242.24 (1992)), expanded the possibilities for
release somewhat beyond the Western Region policy, but
not as far as many commenters had suggested.  It pro-
vides that alien juveniles -shall be released, in order of
preference, to: (i) a parent; (ii) a legal guardian; or (iii) an
adult relative (brother, sister, aunt, uncle, grandparent)
who are [sic] not presently in INS detention,- unless the
INS determines that -the detention of such juvenile is
required to secure his timely appearance before the
Service or the immigration court or to ensure the juve-
nile's safety or that of others.-  8 CFR 242.24(b)(1)
(1992).  If the only listed individuals are in INS detention,
the Service will consider simultaneous release of the
juvenile and custodian -on a discretionary case-by-case
basis.-  242.24(b)(2).  A parent or legal guardian who
is in INS custody or outside the United States may also,
by sworn affidavit, designate another person as capable
and willing to care for the child, provided that person
-execute[s] an agreement to care for the juvenile and to
ensure the juvenile's presence at all future proceedings.-
242.24(b)(3).  Finally, in -unusual and compelling circum-
stances and in the discretion of the [INS] district director
or chief patrol agent,- juveniles may be released to other
adults who execute a care and attendance agreement.
242.24(b)(4).
  If the juvenile is not released under the foregoing
provision, the regulation requires a designated INS official,
the -Juvenile Coordinator,- to locate -suitable placement
. . . in a facility designated for the occupancy of juveniles.-
242.24(c).  The Service may briefly hold the minor in an
-INS detention facility having separate accommodations
for juveniles,- 242.24(d), but under the terms of the
consent decree resolving respondents' conditions-of-deten-
tion claims, the INS must within 72 hours of arrest place
alien juveniles in a facility that meets or exceeds the
standards established by the Alien Minors Care Program
of the Community Relations Service (CRS), Department
of Justice, 52 Fed. Reg. 15569 (1987).  See Memorandum
of Understanding Re Compromise of Class Action: Condi-
tions of Detention, Flores v. Meese, No. 85-4544-RJK (Px)
(CD Cal., Nov. 30, 1987) (incorporating the CRS notice
and program description), reprinted in App. to Pet. for
Cert. 148a-205a (hereinafter Juvenile Care Agreement).
  Juveniles placed in these facilities are deemed to be in
INS detention -because of issues of payment and authori-
zation of medical care.-  53 Fed. Reg., at 17449.  -Legal
custody- rather than -detention- more accurately describes
the reality of the arrangement, however, since these are
not correctional institutions but facilities that meet -state
licensing requirements for the provision of shelter care,
foster care, group care, and related services to dependent
children,- Juvenile Care Agreement 176a, and are operat-
ed -in an open type of setting without a need for extraor-
dinary security measures,- id., at 173a.  The facilities
must provide, in accordance with -applicable child welfare
statutes and generally accepted child welfare standards,
practices, principles and procedures,- id., at 157a, an
extensive list of services, including physical care and
maintenance, individual and group counseling, education,
recreation and leisure-time activities, family reunification
services, and access to religious services, visitors, and
legal assistance, id., at 159a, 178a-185a.
  Although the regulation replaced the Western Region
release policy that had been the focus of respondents'
constitutional claims, respondents decided to maintain the
litigation as a challenge to the new rule.  Just a week
after the regulation took effect, in a brief, unpublished
order that referred only to unspecified -due process
grounds,- the District Court granted summary judgment
to respondents and invalidated the regulatory scheme in
three important respects.  Flores v. Meese, No. CV 85-
4544-RJK (Px) (CD Cal., May 25, 1988), App. to Pet. for
Cert. 146a.  First, the court ordered the INS to release
-any minor otherwise eligible for release . . . to his
parents, guardian, custodian, conservator, or other respon-
sible adult party.-  Ibid. (emphasis added).  Second, the
order dispensed with the regulation's requirement that
unrelated custodians formally agree to care for the juve-
nile, 8 CFR 242.24(b)(3) and (4) (1992), in addition to
ensuring his attendance at future proceedings.  Finally,
the District Court rewrote the related INS regulations
that provide for an initial determination of prima facie
deportability and release conditions before an INS examin-
er, see 287.3, with review by an immigration judge upon
the alien's request, see 242.2(d).  It decreed instead that
an immigration-judge hearing on probable cause and
release restrictions should be provided -forthwith- after
arrest, whether or not the juvenile requests it.  App. to
Pet. for Cert. 146a.
  A divided panel of the Court of Appeals reversed.
Flores v. Meese, 934 F. 2d 991 (CA9 1990).  The Ninth
Circuit voted to rehear the case and selected an eleven-
judge en banc court.  See Ninth Circuit Rule 35-3.  That
court vacated the panel opinion and affirmed the District
Court order -in all respects.-  Flores v. Meese, 942 F. 2d
1352, 1365 (1991).  One judge dissented in part, see id.,
at 1372-1377 (opinion of Rymer, J.), and four in toto, see
id., at 1377-1385 (opinion of Wallace, C. J.).  We granted
certiorari.  502 U. S. ___ (1992).

                           II
  Respondents make three principal attacks upon INS
regulation 242.24.  First, they assert that alien juveniles
suspected of being deportable have a -fundamental- right
to -freedom from physical restraint,- Brief for Respondents
16, and it is therefore a denial of -substantive due pro-
cess- to detain them, since the Service cannot prove that
it is pursuing an important governmental interest in a
manner narrowly tailored to minimize the restraint on
liberty.  Secondly, respondents argue that the regulation
violates -procedural due process,- because it does not
require the Service to determine, with regard to each
individual detained juvenile who lacks an approved
custodian, whether his best interests lie in remaining in
INS custody or in release to some other -responsible
adult.-  Finally, respondents contend that even if the INS
regulation infringes no constitutional rights, it exceeds the
Attorney General's authority under 8 U. S. C. 1252(a)(1).
We find it economic to discuss the objections in that order,
though we of course reach the constitutional issues only
because we conclude that the respondents' statutory
argument fails.
  Before proceeding further, however, we make two
important observations.  First, this is a facial challenge
to INS regulation 242.24.  Respondents do not challenge
its application in a particular instance; it had not yet
been applied in a particular instance-because it was not
yet in existence-when their suit was brought (directed
at the 1984 Western Region release policy), and it had
been in effect only a week when the District Court issued
the judgment invalidating it.  We have before us no
findings of fact, indeed no record, concerning the INS's
interpretation of the regulation or the history of its
enforcement.  We have only the regulation itself and the
statement of basis and purpose that accompanied its
promulgation.  To prevail in such a facial challenge,
respondents -must establish that no set of circumstances
exists under which the [regulation] would be valid.-
United States v. Salerno, 481 U. S. 739, 745 (1987).  That
is true as to both the constitutional challenges, see Schall
v. Martin, 467 U. S. 253, 268, n. 18 (1984), and the
statutory challenge, see NCIR, 502 U. S., at ___ (slip op.,
at 4-5).
  The second point is related.  Respondents spend much
time, and their amici even more, condemning the condi-
tions under which some alien juveniles are held, alleging
that the conditions are so severe as to belie the Service's
stated reasons for retaining custody-leading, presumably,
to the conclusion that the retention of custody is an
unconstitutional infliction of punishment without trial.
See Salerno, supra, at 746-748; Wong Wing v. United
States, 163 U. S. 228, 237 (1896).  But whatever those
conditions might have been when this litigation began,
they are now (at least in the Western Region, where all
members of the respondents' class are held) presumably
in compliance with the extensive requirements set forth
in the Juvenile Care Agreement that settled respondents'
claims regarding detention conditions, see supra, at 5.
The settlement agreement entitles respondents to enforce
compliance with those requirements in the District Court,
see Juvenile Care Agreement 148a-149a, which they
acknowledge they have not done, Tr. of Oral Arg. 43.  We
will disregard the effort to reopen those settled claims by
alleging, for purposes of the challenges to the regulation,
that the detention conditions are other than what the
consent decree says they must be.

                           III
  Respondents' -substantive due process- claim relies upon
our line of cases which interprets the Fifth and Four-
teenth Amendments' guarantee of -due process of law- to
include a substantive component, which forbids the
government to infringe certain -fundamental- liberty
interests at all, no matter what process is provided, unless
the infringement is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling
state interest.  See, e.g., Collins v. City of Harker Heights,
503 U. S. ___, ___ (1992) (slip op., at 9); Salerno, supra,
at 746; Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U. S. 186, 191 (1986).
-Substantive due process- analysis must begin with a
careful description of the asserted right, for -[t]he doctrine
of judicial self-restraint requires us to exercise the utmost
care whenever we are asked to break new ground in this
field.-  Collins, supra, at ___ (slip op., at 9); see Bowers
v. Hardwick, supra, at 194-195.  The -freedom from
physical restraint- invoked by respondents is not at issue
in this case.  Surely not in the sense of shackles, chains,
or barred cells, given the Juvenile Care Agreement.  Nor
even in the sense of a right to come and go at will, since,
as we have said elsewhere, -juveniles, unlike adults, are
always in some form of custody,- Schall, supra, at 265,
and where the custody of the parent or legal guardian
fails, the government may (indeed, we have said must)
either exercise custody itself or appoint someone else to
do so.  Ibid.  Nor is the right asserted the right of a child
to be released from all other custody into the custody of
its parents, legal guardian, or even close relatives: the
challenged regulation requires such release when it is
sought.  Rather, the right at issue is the alleged right of
a child who has no available parent, close relative, or
legal guardian, and for whom the government is responsi-
ble, to be placed in the custody of a willing-and-able
private custodian rather than of a government-operated
or government-selected child-care institution.
  If there exists a fundamental right to be released into
what respondents inaccurately call a -non-custodial
setting,- Brief for Respondents 18, we see no reason why
it would apply only in the context of government custody
incidentally acquired in the course of law enforcement.
It would presumably apply to state custody over orphans
and abandoned children as well, giving federal law and
federal courts a major new role in the management of
state orphanages and other child-care institutions.  Cf.
Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U. S. ___, ___ (1992) (slip
op., at 14).  We are unaware, however, that any
court-aside from the courts below-has ever held that a
child has a constitutional right not to be placed in a
decent and humane custodial institution if there is avail-
able a responsible person unwilling to become the child's
legal guardian but willing to undertake temporary legal
custody.  The mere novelty of such a claim is reason
enough to doubt that -substantive due process- sustains
it; the alleged right certainly cannot be considered -`so
rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as
to be ranked as fundamental.'- Salerno, supra, at 751
(quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U. S. 97, 105
(1934)).  Where a juvenile has no available parent, close
relative, or legal guardian, where the government does not
intend to punish the child, and where the conditions of
governmental custody are decent and humane, such
custody surely does not violate the Constitution.  It is
rationally connected to a governmental interest in -pre-
serving and promoting the welfare of the child,- Santosky
v. Kramer, 455 U. S. 745, 766 (1982), and is not punitive
since it is not excessive in relation to that valid purpose.
See Schall, supra, at 269.
  Although respondents generally argue for the categorical
right of private placement discussed above, at some points
they assert a somewhat more limited constitutional right:
the right to an individualized hearing on whether private
placement would be in the child's -best inter-
ests--followed by private placement if the answer is in
the affirmative.  It seems to us, however, that if institu-
tional custody (despite the availability of responsible
private custodians) is not unconstitutional in itself, it does
not become so simply because it is shown to be less
desirable than some other arrangement for the particular
child. -The best interests of the child,- a venerable phrase
familiar from divorce proceedings, is a proper and feasible
criterion for making the decision as to which of two
parents will be accorded custody.  But it is not tradition-
ally the sole criterion-much less the sole constitutional
criterion-for other, less narrowly channeled judgments
involving children, where their interests conflict in varying
degrees with the interests of others.  Even if it were
shown, for example, that a particular couple desirous of
adopting a child would best provide for the child's welfare,
the child would nonetheless not be removed from the
custody of its parents so long as they were providing for
the child adequately.  See Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U. S.
246, 255 (1978).  Similarly, -the best interests of the
child- is not the legal standard that governs parents' or
guardians' exercise of their custody: so long as certain
minimum requirements of child care are met, the interests
of the child may be subordinated to the interests of other
children, or indeed even to the interests of the parents or
guardians themselves.  See, e.g., R. C. N. v. State, 141
Ga. App. 490, 491, 233 S. E. 2d 866, 867 (1977).
  -The best interests of the child- is likewise not an
absolute and exclusive constitutional criterion for the
government's exercise of the custodial responsibilities that
it undertakes, which must be reconciled with many other
responsibilities.  Thus, child-care institutions operated by
the state in the exercise of its parens patriae authority,
see Schall, supra, at 265, are not constitutionally required
to be funded at such a level as to provide the best school-
ing or the best health care available; nor does the Consti-
tution require them to substitute, wherever possible,
private nonadoptive custody for institutional care.  And
the same principle applies, we think, to the governmental
responsibility at issue here, that of retaining or transfer-
ring custody over a child who has come within the Feder-
al Government's control, when the parents or guardians
of that child are nonexistent or unavailable.  Minimum
standards must be met, and the child's fundamental rights
must not be impaired; but the decision to go beyond those
requirements-to give one or another of the child's addi-
tional interests priority over other concerns that compete
for public funds and administrative attention-is a policy
judgment rather than a constitutional imperative.
  Respondents' -best interests- argument is, in essence,
a demand that the INS program be narrowly tailored to
minimize the denial of release into private custody.  But
narrow tailoring is required only when fundamental rights
are involved.  The impairment of a lesser interest (here,
the alleged interest in being released into the custody of
strangers) demands no more than a -reasonable fit-
between governmental purpose (here, protecting the
welfare of the juveniles who have come into the govern-
ment's custody) and the means chosen to advance that
purpose.  This leaves ample room for an agency to decide,
as the INS has, that administrative factors such as lack
of child-placement expertise favor using one means rather
than another.  There is, in short, no constitutional need
for a hearing to determine whether private placement
would be better, so long as institutional custody is (as we
readily find it to be, assuming compliance with the
requirements of the consent decree) good enough.
  If we harbored any doubts as to the constitutionality of
institutional custody over unaccompanied juveniles, they
would surely be eliminated as to those juveniles (conceded-
ly the overwhelming majority of all involved here) who are
aliens.  -For reasons long recognized as valid, the respon-
sibility for regulating the relationship between the United
States and our alien visitors has been committed to the
political branches of the Federal Government.-  Mathews
v. Diaz, 426 U. S. 67, 81 (1976).  -`[O]ver no conceivable
subject is the legislative power of Congress more com-
plete.'-  Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U. S. 787, 792 (1977) (quoting
Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U. S.
320, 339 (1909)).  Thus, -in the exercise of its broad
power over immigration and naturalization, `Congress reg-
ularly makes rules that would be unacceptable if applied
to citizens.'-  430 U. S., at 792 (quoting Mathews v. Diaz,
supra, at 79-80).  Respondents do not dispute that Con-
gress has the authority to detain aliens suspected of en-
tering the country illegally pending their deportation hear-
ings, see Carlson v. Landon, 342 U. S. 524, 538 (1952);
Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U. S., at 235.  And in
enacting the precursor to 8 U. S. C. 1252(a), Congress
eliminated any presumption of release pending deporta-
tion, committing that determination to the discretion of
the Attorney General.  See Carlson v. Landon, supra, at
538-540.  Of course, the INS regulation must still meet
the (unexacting) standard of rationally advancing some le-
gitimate governmental purpose-which it does, as we shall
discuss later in connection with the statutory challenge.
  Respondents also argue, in a footnote, that the INS
release policy violates the -equal protection guarantee- of
the Fifth Amendment because of the disparate treatment
evident in (1) releasing alien juveniles with close relatives
or legal guardians but detaining those without, and (2)
releasing to unrelated adults juveniles detained pending
federal delinquency proceedings, see 18 U. S. C. 5034,
but detaining unaccompanied alien juveniles pending
deportation proceedings.  The tradition of reposing custody
in close relatives and legal guardians is in our view
sufficient to support the former distinction; and the
difference between citizens and aliens is adequate to
support the latter.

                           IV
  We turn now from the claim that the INS cannot
deprive respondents of their asserted liberty interest at
all, to the -procedural due process- claim that the Service
cannot do so on the basis of the procedures it provides.
It is well established that the Fifth Amendment entitles
aliens to due process of law in deportation proceedings.
See The Japanese Immigrant Case, 189 U. S. 86, 100-101
(1903).  To determine whether these alien juveniles have
received it here, we must first review in some detail the
procedures the INS has employed.
  Though a procedure for obtaining warrants to arrest
named individuals is available, see 8 U. S. C. 1252(a)(1);
8 CFR 242.2(c)(1) (1992), the deportation process ordi-
narily begins with a warrantless arrest by an INS officer
who has reason to believe that the arrestee -is in the
United States in violation of any [immigration] law or
regulation and is likely to escape before a warrant can be
obtained,- 8 U. S. C. 1357(a)(2).  Arrested aliens are
almost always offered the choice of departing the country
voluntarily, 8 U. S. C. 1252(b) (1988 ed., Supp. III); 8
CFR 242.5 (1992), and as many as 98% of them take
that course.  See INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U. S. 1032,
1044 (1984).  Before the Service seeks execution of a
voluntary departure form by a juvenile, however, the
juvenile -must in fact communicate with either a parent,
adult relative, friend, or with an organization found on
the free legal services list.-  8 CFR 242.24(g) (1992).
If the juvenile does not seek voluntary departure, he must
be brought before an INS examining officer within 24
hours of his arrest.  287.3; see 8 U. S. C. 1357(a)(2).
The examining officer is a member of the Service's en-
forcement staff, but must be someone other than the
arresting officer (unless no other qualified examiner is
readily available).  8 CFR 287.3 (1992).  If the examiner
determines that -there is prima facie evidence establishing
that the arrested alien is in the United States in violation
of the immigration laws,- ibid., a formal deportation
proceeding is initiated through the issuance of an order
to show cause, 242.1, and within 24 hours the decision
is made whether to continue the alien juvenile in custody
or release him,  287.3.
  The INS notifies the alien of the commencement of a
deportation proceeding and of the decision as to custody
by serving him with a Form I-221S (reprinted in App. to
Brief for Petitioners 7a-8a) which, pursuant to the Immi-
gration Act of 1990, 8 U. S. C. 1252b(a)(3)(A) (1988 ed.,
Supp. III), must be in English and Spanish.  The front of
this form notifies the alien of the allegations against him
and the date of his deportation hearing.  The back con-
tains a section entitled -NOTICE OF CUSTODY DETER-
MINATION,- in which the INS officer checks a box
indicating whether the alien will be detained in the
custody of the Service, released on recognizance, or
released under bond.  Beneath these boxes, the form
states: -You may request the Immigration Judge to
redetermine this decision.-   See 8 CFR 242.2(c)(2)
(1992).  (The immigration judge is a quasi-judicial officer
in the Executive Office for Immigration Review, a division
separated from the Service's enforcement staff.  3.10.)
The alien must check either a box stating -I do- or a box
stating -[I] do not request a redetermination by an
Immigration Judge of the custody decision,- and must
then sign and date this section of the form.  If the alien
requests a hearing and is dissatisfied with the outcome,
he may obtain further review by the Board of Immigration
Appeals, 242.2(d); 3.1(b)(7), and by the federal courts,
see, e.g., Carlson v. Landon, supra, at 529, 531.
  Respondents contend that this procedural system is
unconstitutional because it does not require the Service
to determine in the case of each individual alien juvenile
that detention in INS custody would better serve his
interests than release to some other -responsible adult.-
This is just the -substantive due process- argument recast
in -procedural due process- terms, and we reject it for the
same reasons.
  The District Court and the en banc Court of Appeals
concluded that the INS procedures are faulty because they
do not provide for automatic review by an immigration
judge of the initial deportability and custody determina-
tions.  See 942 F. 2d, at 1364.  We disagree.  At least
insofar as this facial challenge is concerned, due process
is satisfied by giving the detained alien juveniles the right
to a hearing before an immigration judge.  It has not been
shown that all of them are too young or too ignorant to
exercise that right when the form asking them to assert
or waive it is presented.  Most are 16 or 17 years old and
will have been in telephone contact with a responsible
adult outside the INS-sometimes a legal services attor-
ney.  The waiver, moreover, is revocable: the alien may
request a judicial redetermination at any time later in the
deportation process.  See 8 CFR 242.2(d) (1992); Matter
of Uluocha, 20 I. & N. Dec. ___ (Interim Dec. 3124, BIA
1989).  We have held that juveniles are capable of -know-
ingly and intelligently- waiving their right against self-
incrimination in criminal cases.  See Fare v. Michael C.,
442 U. S. 707, 724-727 (1979); see also United States v.
Saucedo-Velasquez, 843 F. 2d 832, 835 (CA5 1988) (apply-
ing Fare to alien juvenile).  The alleged right to redeter-
mination of prehearing custody status in deportation cases
is surely no more significant.
    Respondents point out that the regulations do not set
a time period within which the immigration-judge hearing,
if requested, must be held.  But we will not assume, on
this facial challenge, that an excessive delay will invari-
ably ensue-particularly since there is no evidence of such
delay, even in isolated instances.  Cf. Matter of Chirinos,
16 I. & N. Dec. 276 (BIA 1977).

                            V
  Respondents contend that the regulation goes beyond
the scope of the Attorney General's discretion to continue
custody over arrested aliens under 8 U. S. C. 1252(a)(1).
That contention must be rejected if the regulation has a
-`reasonable foundation,'- Carlson v. Landon, supra, at
541, that is, if it rationally pursues a purpose that it is
lawful for the INS to seek.  See also NCIR, 502 U. S., at
___ (slip op., at 11).  We think that it does.
  The statement of basis and purpose accompanying
promulgation of regulation 242.42, in addressing the
question -as to whose custody the juvenile should be
released,- began with the dual propositions that -concern
for the welfare of the juvenile will not permit release to
just any adult- and that -the Service has neither the
expertise nor the resources to conduct home studies for
placement of each juvenile released.-  Detention and
Release of Juveniles, 53 Fed. Reg. 17449, 17449 (1988).
The INS decided to -strik[e] a balance- by defining a list
of presumptively appropriate custodians while maintaining
the discretion of local INS directors to release detained
minors to other custodians in -unusual and compelling
circumstances.-  Ibid.  The list begins with parents, whom
our society and this Court's jurisprudence have always
presumed to be the preferred and primary custodians of
their minor children.  See Parham v. J. R., 442 U. S. 584,
602-603 (1979).  The list extends to other close blood
relatives, whose protective relationship with children our
society has also traditionally respected.  See Moore v. East
Cleveland, 431 U. S. 494 (1977); compare Village of Bell
Terre v. Boras, 416 U. S. 1 (1974).  And finally, the list
includes persons given legal guardianship by the States,
which we have said possess -special proficiency- in the
field of domestic relations, including child custody.
Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at
14).  When neither parent, close relative, or state-appoint-
ed guardian is immediately available, the INS will
normally keep legal custody of the juvenile, place him in
a government-supervised and state-licensed shelter-care
facility, and continue searching for a relative or guardian,
although release to others is possible in unusual cases.
  Respondents object that this scheme is motivated purely
by -administrative convenience,- a charge echoed by the
dissent, see, e.g., post, at 1-2.  This fails to grasp the
distinction between administrative convenience (or, to
speak less pejoratively, administrative efficiency) as the
purpose of a policy-for example, a policy of not consider-
ing late-filed objections-and administrative efficiency as
the reason for selecting one means of achieving a purpose
over another.  Only the latter is at issue here.  The
requisite statement of basis and purpose published by the
INS upon promulgation of regulation 242.24 declares that
the purpose of the rule is to protect -the welfare of the
juvenile,- 53 Fed. Reg., at 17449, and there is no basis for
calling that false.  (Respondents' contention that the real
purpose was to save money imputes not merely mendacity
but irrationality, since respondents point out that deten-
tion in shelter-care facilities is more expensive than
release.)  Because the regulation involves no deprivation
of a -fundamental- right, the Service was not compelled
to ignore the costs and difficulty of alternative means of
advancing its declared goal.  Compare Stanley v. Illinois,
405 U. S. 645, 656-657 (1972).  It is impossible to contra-
dict the Service's assessment that it lacks the -expertise,-
and is not -qualified,- to do individualized child-placement
studies, 53 Fed. Reg., at 17449, and the right alleged here
provides no basis for this Court to impose upon what is
essentially a law-enforcement agency the obligation to
expend its limited resources in developing such expertise
and qualification.  That reordering of priorities is for
Congress-which has shown, we may say, no inclination
to shrink from the task.  See, e.g., 8 U. S. C. 1154(c)
(requiring INS to determine if applicants for immigration
are involved in -sham- marriages).  We do not hold, as
the dissent contends, that -minimizing administrative
costs- is adequate justification for the Service's detention
of juveniles, post, at 1; but we do hold that a detention
program justified by the need to protect the welfare of
juveniles is not constitutionally required to give custody
to strangers if that entails the expenditure of administra-
tive effort and resources that the Service is unwilling to
commit.
  Respondents also contend that the INS regulation
violates the statute because it relies upon a -blanket-
presumption of the unsuitability of custodians other than
parents, close relatives, and guardians.  We have stated
that, at least in certain contexts, the Attorney General's
exercise of discretion under 1252(a)(1) requires -some
level of individualized determination.-  NCIR, 502 U. S.,
at ___ (slip op., at 11); see also Carlson v. Landon, 342
U. S., at 538.  But as NCIR itself demonstrates, this does
not mean that the Service must forswear use of reason-
able presumptions and generic rules.  See 502 U. S., at
___, n. 11 (slip op., at 12-13, n. 11); cf. Heckler v. Camp-
bell, 461 U. S. 458, 467 (1983).  In the case of each
detained alien juvenile, the INS makes those determina-
tions that are specific to the individual and necessary to
accurate application of the regulation: Is there reason to
believe the alien deportable?  Is the alien under 18 years
of age?  Does the alien have an available adult relative
or legal guardian?  Is the alien's case so exceptional as
to require consideration of release to someone else?  The
particularization and individuation need go no further
than this.
  Finally, respondents claim that the regulation is an
abuse of discretion because it permits the INS, once
having determined that an alien juvenile lacks an avail-
able relative or legal guardian, to hold the juvenile in
detention indefinitely.  That is not so.  The period of
custody is inherently limited by the pending deportation
hearing, which must be concluded with -reasonable
dispatch- to avoid habeas corpus.  8 U. S. C. 1252(a)(1);
cf. Salerno v. United States, 481 U. S. 739, 747 (1987)
(noting time limits placed on pretrial detention by the
Speedy Trial Act).  It is expected that alien juveniles will
remain in INS custody an average of only 30 days.  See
Juvenile Care Agreement 178a.  There is no evidence that
alien juveniles are being held for undue periods pursuant
to regulation 242.24, or that habeas corpus is insufficient
to remedy particular abuses.  And the reasonableness
of the Service's negative assessment of putative custodians
who fail to obtain legal guardianship would seem, if
anything, to increase as time goes by.

                         *  *  *
  We think the INS policy now in place is a reasonable
response to the difficult problems presented when the
Service arrests unaccompanied alien juveniles.  It may
well be that other policies would be even better, but -we
are [not] a legislature charged with formulating public
policy.-  Schall v. Martin, 467 U. S., at 281.  On its face,
INS regulation 242.24 accords with both the Constitution
and the relevant statute.
  The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and
the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent
with this opinion.
                                      It is so ordered.